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Abstract 
 
This paper provides estimates of the effects of divorce on the lifetime incomes of mothers. This is 
an issue that is not well explored in most countries, and has been essentially untouched 
empirically in the Australian context. The paper extends the existing literature, which has generally 
focused on the short-term economic implications of divorce for mothers. Simulations are used to 
provide insights into the impact of divorce for a host of disparate circumstances. It is found that the 
relative income costs of divorce differ greatly depending upon the relative earnings capacity of the 
mother and father. Women with a much lower earning capacity than their partner face particularly 
large income costs of divorce. It is also found that the relative income costs of divorce fall as 
the number of children increases. The importance of child support payment to the household 
income of mothers following divorce is highlighted.  It is found that the income of mothers would be 
higher if they received child support levels commensurate with the government’s non- resident 
parent child support rules, rather than what they report actually receiving. 
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Relationship breakdown and the economic welfare of 
Australian mothers and their children 
 
1. Introduction  
One of the most significant changes affecting Australian society over the last thirty years has 
been a dramatic increase in the rate of relationship breakdown. While there is a substantial 
literature on the economic implications of divorce, most of the existing studies consider the 
impacts for women at a single point in time rather than the cumulative lifetime consequences.  
Studies have generally found that women experience a decline in financial circumstances 
post-divorce (e.g. de Vaus, Gray, Qu and Stanton 2007; Jarvis and Jenkins 1997, Perry et al. 
2000, Pulkingham 1995, Smock, Manning and Gupta 1999, Smyth and Weston 2000), and 
the social and economic implications of divorce are probably most serious for relationships in 
which children are involved. There is a literature that suggests that, in addition to parental 
conflict, it is the economic fallout from divorce that results in many of the negative 
consequences of divorce for children (e.g. Ambert 1998, Duncan 1994).  
 
Quantifying the lifetime economic consequences of divorce is an issue that has been 
essentially untouched empirically in the Australian context. This paper begins to fill this gap 
by providing estimates of the effects of divorce on the lifetime economic welfare of 
Australian mothers and their resident children. Statistically estimated parameters concerning 
women’s labour supply and earnings, and men’s contributions to both household income and 
child support are used to simulate the effect of divorce on the household income of mothers. 
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 This provides insights into the impact of divorce for a host of disparate circumstances.1 
Simulations of this type have been effectively employed for Britain (Davies, Joshi, Rake and 
Alami 2000; Davies and Joshi 2001). 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, the Australian system of social 
protection is briefly described. Second, the method used to estimate the impact of marital on 
the lifetime household income of mothers and their children is described. Third, the data 
used, the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, is 
described. Fourth the results of the regression modelling of the determinants of employment, 
earnings and child support are discussed. Fifth, the results of the simulations of the impact of 
divorce on mothers’ economic wellbeing are presented.  
 
2. The Australian system of social protection  
In this section the government benefits provided to families with dependent children are 
briefly outlined and the Child Support Scheme is described.2 Benefits are flat rate, paid from 
general government revenue and are subject to income and assets tests, but these are generous 
compared to the means tests in most other OECD countries. One type of family assistance 
involves supplements to families with children (Family Tax Benefit Part A and Part B). The 
other type of payments are income support designed to provide a minimally adequate income 
to those parents with no or limited income from other sources. The main type of income 
                                                 
1 In Australia, legally married and cohabiting couples are treated equally by the family law system for most 
purposes and identically by the social security system. Therefore, we do not distinguish between legal 
marriages and cohabiting relationships. In the remainder of this paper we use the term divorce to refer to the 
time at which a couple finally separates (not the legal dissolution of the marriage). For cohabiting couples 
there is no legal process to end the de facto marriage.  
2 The description of the income support system is for 2001 at the time wave 1 of the HILDA survey was 
collected. A detailed description of the Australian system is provided by Whiteford and Angenent (2001). 
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 support available to mothers with young dependent children is the Parenting Payment.3 Other 
payments, including those related to unemployment or disability, are available to working age 
individuals.  
 
Given the prevalence of relationship breakdown, a major public policy concern is to promote 
the care and financial support of children following marital separation. Australian Child 
Support policy is based on the view that children whose parents have separated should 
themselves have a standard of living that reflects the living standard of both parents, not just 
the one with whom they usually live. The key public response has been the development and 
enforcement of the Child Support Scheme (CSS), which came into effect in 1988-89.4 The 
CSS is designed to ensure, among other things, that parents share in the cost of supporting 
their children according to their capacity (Smyth 2004).  
 
Under the CSS a formula is used to calculate the amount of money that a non-resident parent 
is required to pay. This is determined by a number of factors including: the number of 
children who require support; the income of the resident parent; and the non-resident parent’s 
“capacity” to pay. Child support can be paid via private arrangement between parents, or it 
can be collected from the non-resident parent by the Child Support Agency (CSA) and paid 
to the resident parent.5 CSA Collection occurs via the Federal income tax system. In theory, 
application of the Child Support formula results in the minimum amount that a non-resident 
                                                 
3  From 1 July 2006 significant changes were made to the income support system including restricting 
Parenting Payment to those whose youngest child is under 6 years for partnered primary carers and 8 years 
for single primary carers. Primary carers receiving Parenting Payment prior to 1 July will continue to be 
eligible to receive Parenting Payment until their youngest child is aged 16 years. A part-time activity 
requirement of 15 hours per week applies to those with a youngest child aged 6 years or older. 
4 The CSS specifies the amount of child support to be paid according to an administrative formula.  
5 The terms custodial and non-custodial are sometimes used to describe the circumstances of the parent with 
whom the child lives. We use the terms resident and custodial interchangeably in this paper. 
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 parent should be paying. However, if apparently agreed between parents, the amount actually 
paid may be less than that implied by the formula.6 
 
3. Method  
The Broad Approach 
The estimation of the impact of marital breakdown on the lifetime household income of 
mothers and their children uses a counterfactual approach. Specifically our method attempts 
to model the economic implication of divorce as the difference between the lifetime 
household income of a mother who gets divorced and her lifetime household income had she 
remained partnered.7  
 
Since demographic transitions such as childbearing and divorce almost always change the 
number of people living in a household, it is necessary to adjust the lifetime household 
incomes for differences in the number and age of people sharing that income. This is 
achieved through the application of the New OECD equivalence scale.8 
 
In the partnered case household income comprises female and male earnings, plus 
government cash benefits.9 In the event of separation a woman’s household income is 
                                                 
6  The Child Support Scheme is currently in the process of being reformed, with a number of changes having 
been announced and some are currently being implemented. The changes include efforts to increase the 
compliance of non-residential parents with their child support obligations and changes to the formulae 
which will result in variations in child support obligations. The new formulae will take affect from 1 July 
2008. The impact of the reforms on the amount of child support paid will depend upon a range of factors 
including the level of payments required under the formulae, the effectiveness of the efforts to increase 
compliance with child support obligations and the behavioural impact of the reforms in terms of labour 
supply and children’s living arrangements. 
7 Divorce often has implications for the level of assets held by ex-partners. For example, the family home 
may be sold in order to buy to new homes or because the housing debt can no longer be met. 
8 The New OECD equivalence scale is constructed as follows: the first adult in the household adds 1 to the 
scale, second and subsequent adults add 0.5 to the scale, and each child below the age of 18 years adds 0.3 
to the scale.  
9 For simplicity, income from investments and private transfers are ignored.  
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 affected by: (i) changes in her earnings, through the effect of the separation on hours worked 
and hourly wages; (ii) differences in government financial support due to changes in 
household income and relationship status; and (iii) changes in the contribution of the father to 
the mother’s household income if the couple has had children. The specific methods used are 
as follows. 
 
For women the association between income, on the one hand, and number and age of children 
and marital history, on the other, is estimated in two stages: with respect to the determinants 
of being in paid employment; and, for women who are working for pay, with the use of an 
earnings function estimated using data from Wave 1 (2001) of the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. To the above calculations are added similar 
simulations of husbands’ income. If the couple remain together, and the assumption is made 
that there is complete sharing of incomes between husband and wife, in this case the exercise 
is fairly straightforward.10  
 
For separated/divorced women the construction of the hypothetical scenarios is more 
complex because non-resident fathers’ incomes are not observed directly in the data, meaning 
that payments from the non-resident parent need to be estimated. In this paper we use two 
approaches to estimating child support payment. The first involves calculating what levels of 
child support by applying the CSS formula in different scenarios concerning the father’s 
income (predicted for a range of levels of education), with the second approach being 
motivated by the fact that some non-resident parents do not meet their child support 
obligations (Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005).  
                                                 
10 However, it should be recognised that there is not necessarily equivalence in the sharing of incomes within 
a family, and this might be critical in determining the extent to which children and their mothers are 
affected by separation (Davies et al 2000). 
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In the latter approach child support is estimated using resident mothers’ reports of child 
support payments received from non-resident fathers, with the modelling of child support 
payments including human capital, demographic and fertility variables. The results are used 
to estimate child support payments for a range of hypothetical families.  
 
In all simulations social security payments are calculated on the basis of social security 
program rules11 given different assumptions concerning the mother’s and father’s income, 
and the number and ages of children. In estimating the impact of children and relationship 
history on labour market earnings we make a number of assumptions: (i) fertility decisions 
are exogenous, and thus not influenced by expectations of marital dissolution; and (ii) marital 
dissolution is exogenous.  
 
The above may not be inconsequential assumptions. For example, it is plausible that women 
with higher earnings capacity who are in an “unhappy” relationship are more likely to end 
that relationship than similarly “unhappy” women with lower earnings capacity, and this 
possibility is not modelled. The major methodological point is that our simulations are 
essentially descriptive, illustrating the likely consequences of relationship breakdown for 
mothers, but not directly testing behavioural relationships. 
 
The Approach in Detail 
A number of steps are involved in constructing our simulations of lifetime equivalent 
household income.  
                                                 
11 It is believed that take-up of benefits is close to 100 per cent so this approach is likely to be accurate. 
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 (i) First, the impact of human capital, demographic and relationship status on the 
probability of employment for women and men are estimated. Second, the 
determinants of weekly earnings for women and men are estimated. For women, the 
explanatory variables include number and age of children, educational attainment, 
current relationship status, whether they have been divorced and length of time since 
divorce. For men, explanatory variables include educational attainment, current 
relationship status and whether they have been divorced. Employment and earnings 
are not modelled as varying with fertility or with length of time since divorce. 
(ii) The age profile of expected earnings is constructed by multiplying the probability of 
employment at each age by the expected weekly earnings if employed. For men and 
women the age profile of expected earnings is constructed for different levels of 
educational attainment and for the examples of both continuous marriage and divorce. 
For women, profiles are also constructed with respect to different numbers of 
children.  
(iii) To these predictions of earnings are added social security payments from government, 
with the amounts being determined by government rules.12 
(iv) Household income is then converted to an after-tax amount by the application of the 
rules of the income tax system.  
(v) In the divorce scenarios where there are dependent children, child support payments 
are added to the mother’s household income if a child aged less than 18 is present. 
CSS payments are estimated in two ways: applying the rules of the CSS; and using 
mothers’ reports of child support received. 
                                                 
12 The source of information on payments is Centrelink (2002), A Guide to Commonwealth Government 
Payments, 1 July –19 September 2001. 
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 (vi) These different earnings, and social security and child support payment streams, are 
used to construct measures of resident parent family labour market incomes over the 
lifecycle.  
(vii) Differences in family size and composition are adjusted for through application of the 
New OECD equivalence scale. 
 
The above methods can be used to illustrate a plethora of different possible outcomes, and we 
have chosen to present results for a small number of scenarios (defined on the basis of the 
highest educational attainment of both members of the couple), which are as follows: (i) the 
female and male both have year 10 only (that is, they leave high school at around the age of 
16); (ii) the female and male both have university degrees; (iii) the female has year 10 only 
and the male has a degree; and (iv) the female has a degree and the male has year 10 only. 
The first two cases reflect what is known as positive assortative mating (individuals alike in 
education terms marry), and the last two reflect the opposite.  
 
4. The HILDA data described 
HILDA is a large nationally based random longitudinal sample of Australian households, and 
for our exercises we use the first wave of data collected during 2001. HILDA is ideal for this 
purpose because it contains detailed information about labour market variables, fertility, and 
relationship histories, and child support payments. Information is collected about all. All non-
child members of the household are surveyed in HILDA and  in wave 1 information was 
collected from almost 14,000 people aged from 15 years from 7,682 households across 
Australia. 
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 Very few of the mothers (1.6 per cent) or fathers (0.7 per cent) have never been married. The 
majority (69.1 per cent) of mothers have are married and have not been divorced, while 29.2 
per cent have experienced divorce subsequent to having children. For fathers, nearly three-
quarters (74.3 per cent) are married and never divorced and one-quarter (25.1 per cent) 
experienced divorce after having children.13 
 
Table 1 shows the employment rates, hours of work, weekly earnings and hourly wage rates 
of mothers and fathers by post-children marital history. The employment rates of females 
who have not been separated after having children are a little higher than for those who have 
been separated (63.0 and 59.3 per cent respectively). For males, those who have been 
separated have a 14.7 percentage point lower employment rate than those who have not been 
separated (88.2 and 73.5 per cent respectively).  
 
Table 1. Employment rates, usual working hours and earnings by post-children 
marital history and gender, employed parents  
 Not divorced/separated Divorced/separated 
 Female Male Female Male 
Employment (per cent) 63.0 88.2 59.3 73.5 
Usual hours per week 28.7 46.4 32.4 45.2 
Weekly earnings ($2001) 530 1055 564 929 
Hourly wage rate ($2001) 19.84 22.91 17.26 20.95 
Notes:  Excluded from the table are those who have never been married. The self-employed are classified as 
being employed in the calculation of the employment rate but are excluded in the calculation of usual 
hours per week, weekly earnings and hourly wage rate. 
Source: HILDA 2001. 
 
As expected, fathers work much longer hours than mothers, and earn more per hour (by about 
15 per cent). Women who have been divorced work longer hours for pay on average than 
women who have not been divorced, but the former earn a lower hourly wage rate. On 
                                                 
13   Respondents aged 18 to 60 years. Marriage refers to both legal marriage and cohabiting relationships. 
Dependent students are excluded, as are those who have been widowed and those with incomplete post-
children relationship histories. Respondents who were not in a relationship when their first child was born 
but who subsequently partner and never divorce are classified as being continuously married after having 
children. 
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 average, women who have been divorced and who are employed earn more per week than 
women who have not been divorced after having children ($564 and $530 per week 
respectively, in 2001$). For men, there is little difference in usual working hours with respect 
to post-children marital history. However, men who have been divorced earn less per hour 
than those who have not been divorced (by about 10 per cent), which is almost certainly the 
result of unobserved variables associated with marital status rather than the consequence of 
marital status. Again, we stress the limitations of essentially descriptive exercises such as 
these. 
 
5. Estimates of determinants of employment, earnings and child support 
This section describes the models of the determinants of employment, earnings and child 
support in order to provide the parameters used in the simulations. The sample used in the 
estimation is restricted to respondents aged 18 to 60 years. Dependent students, respondents 
who have been widowed, and respondents with missing information on their post children 
relationship histories are excluded.14 The sample summary and coefficient estimates are 
presented in Appendix A.  
 
Probability of employment 
The probability of employment equation uses the standard approach of a binary dependent 
variable (employed or not employed) in a logistic regression. Economic theory suggests that a 
range of economic and demographic variables will affect this probability and the theoretical 
basis underlying these relationships is well known (see Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). The 
key variables are now briefly described.  
                                                 
14 In addition to the above exclusions, for the weekly earnings we exclude respondents: with very low hourly 
wage rates (less than $2.00 per hour); with very high hourly wage rates (more than $200 per hour); who are 
self employed since their earnings are likely to represent something different than earnings for employees; 
who are currently employed but report having zero actual labour market experience; and who report being 
employed but report zero earnings. 
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For both fathers and mothers the explanatory variables include age, highest level of 
educational attainment, state of residence, geographical area (major city, inner regional or 
outer regional area), health status and being a migrant. For mothers the impact of child 
rearing on the probability of employment is measured in a number of ways, and the 
permanent impact of ever having children is captured by a dummy variable, with a series of 
variables being used to identify whether a woman has: children aged less than 3 years of age; 
children aged 3 to 5 years; one child aged 6 to 15; two children aged 6 to 15; and three or 
more children aged 6 to 15. For males children are assumed to have no impact on the 
probability of employment. 
 
For mothers and fathers the impact of divorce on the probability of employment is captured 
through variables measuring whether the respondent has a partner and whether any current 
relationship is the result of re-partnering and having been married (before or after having 
children). For mothers the effect of length of time since divorce is captured using a set of 
dummy variables (divorce occurred less than 3 years ago, 4 to 10 years ago, or 11 years or 
more ago).15 In addition a variable is included capturing whether the woman has an employed 
partner.  
 
The results, presented in the Appendix, are fairly familiar for exercises of this type and are 
not discussed in detail in this paper. A main finding is that increases in educational attainment 
increase the probability of employment for males and females, although the effects of 
education are stronger for women than men. For females having young children substantially 
reduces the probability of being employed, as does having many children under the age of 16.  
                                                 
15 If a parent has experienced two or more relationship breakdowns after the birth of their first child we use 
the length of time since their first relationship ended. 
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Labour market earnings 
Earnings determination has an extensive and well-established empirical literature, and the 
usual methodological framework is adopted here. In this approach the natural logarithm of 
earnings is expressed as a function of labour market experience, educational attainment and a 
number of other economic and demographic variables. For this equation both actual time in 
employment and tenure with the current employer are included to capture the impact of 
different types of labour market experience.  
 
The earnings equation results are familiar for exercises of this type and are presented in the 
Appendix. MATT, IS THIS RIGHT? IF NOT, CAN WE REPORT WHERE THEY CAN 
FIND THE RESULTS? To help anticipate the simulations, the coefficients from the 
probability of employment and earnings equations can be used to illustrate differences in 
earnings for women and men by the number and age of children, marital history and 
educational attainment. The earnings profiles have been constructed by multiplying the 
probability of employment by earnings if employed.  
 
In all of the simulations the following hypothetical illustrations have been used: the woman is 
assumed to marry at age 25; her husband is also assumed to be 25 years old; women have 
one, two or three children, with the first child being born when the woman is aged 28, the 
second at age 30, and the third at age 32; two levels of education are considered, year 10 
schooling or less, and having a university degree level qualification; and if divorce occurs it 
happens at age 36. The simulations are conducted holding region of residence, state of 
 12
 residence, health status and country of birth at the sample averages. In the simulations, if a 
woman has a partner he is assumed to be employed.16 
 
Figure 1 shows before tax earnings profiles according to number and age of children for 
women with Year 10 education level who are continuously married. The profiles show that 
the earnings are lower when there are young children and increase as the age of the youngest 
child increases. There is a permanent reduction in earnings from child bearing. 
 
Figure 1. Earnings profile (before tax) by number of children, females with Year 10 
education only, continuous marriage  
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Figure 2 shows the before tax earnings profile of mothers by education level both for women 
who are continuously married and for women who experience divorce after having children. 
                                                 
16 A complication in predicting labour market earnings is that the earnings equation includes actual experience 
as an explanatory variable. Labour market experience at each age is constructed by adding the predicted 
probability of employment for each year to the experience measure. This means that if a person has low 
probability of employment given their marital, fertility and education profiles then relatively little is added 
to the labour market experience. If employed tenure is allowed to vary according to labour market 
experience. This is achieved through the results of regression of tenure against labour market experience 
(specified as a cubic). 
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 There are several key points. First, the results suggest very significant differences in lifetime 
earnings for women with low education compared to women with high levels of education. 
Second, divorce reduces mothers’ earnings, but these differences are small.  
 
Figure 2. Earnings profile (before tax) by marital history and educational attainment, 
females with two children 
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From Figure 3 it is also apparent that education is an important determinant of earnings for 
men. Divorce is estimated to reduce male earnings by around 15 per cent for high education 
men and has a substantial and growing influence with age, although it seems likely that there 
are too few data points at the extremes of the sample by age for us to be confident that the 
functional form is robust. There are a number of possible reasons as to why divorce may have 
a negative effect on earnings of men, and they include adverse mental and physical health 
consequences of divorce and non-resident fathers reducing their labour market participation 
in order to reduce the amount of child support payable or having shared care of their children 
which reduces labour market earning capacity. However, it is probable that some part of this 
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 effect is a consequence of unobservable differences between divorced and married and never 
divorced married males, and it is thus not attributable only to the effects of marital status. 
Figure 3. Earnings profile (before tax) by marital history and educational attainment, 
males 
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The bottom line from the employment and earnings estimations is that the results are 
generally familiar and the regressions seem well behaved. This leads to some confidence as 
to their usefulness with respect to the simulations of household income presented in Sections 
6 and 7. 
 
Mothers’ Reports of the Receipt of Child Support 
A potential contribution to the household incomes of divorced women is child support 
received from the non-resident father, and HILDA includes this information as reported by 
resident mothers.17 Amongst women with dependent children who have a parent living 
elsewhere, 51.4 per cent report receiving child support payments with the average amount 
                                                 
17  Non-custodial fathers’ reports of child support are also available in HILDA. We have not used these data 
since there is no reported connection between separated former couples. 
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 received being $2,493 per annum. Amongst mothers who receive child support payments, the 
average amount received is $4,854.  
 
The determinants of the amount of child support received by resident mothers are estimated 
using regression modelling, and the coefficients are used to construct simulations of mothers’ 
household incomes following divorce. A Tobit regression model is used because the 
dependent variable takes on the value of zero for a significant number of observations, and is 
continuous for the remainder.18 The coefficients from this model are used to construct 
simulations of mothers’ household income following divorce. 
 
6. Simulating the impact of divorce on mothers’ economic wellbeing 
The simulations presented in this section illustrate the effect of divorce on lifetime economic 
wellbeing. The results of the simulations are presented in several ways, with the age profiles 
of equivalent after-tax household incomes being shown for ages 23 to 60. The effects of 
divorce on mothers’ household income (in $2001) are summarised by comparing the total 
lifetime equivalent household income if divorce occurs to what total lifetime equivalent 
household income would have been if the mother had remained married.  
 
Age profile of mothers’ equivalent household income 
Figures 4 to 7 show the age profiles of equivalent after-tax household incomes for 
continuously married and divorced mothers who do not subsequently re-partner. To highlight 
some key points we present the profiles for the two children scenarios.   
 
                                                 
18 The statistical characteristics of the data and the regression coefficients are reported in Appendix A. 
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 For the “low education mother / high education” father couple (Figure 4) a number of points 
can be made. First, equivalent after-tax household income increases dramatically when 
marriage occurs (age 25), which is the result of a higher earning male income being added to 
the woman’s household income. When the first child is born (age 28) the family equivalent 
household income drops. This occurs because of the fall in mother’s earnings fall and 
because the addition of a person to the family decreases equivalent household income. The 
birth of a second child (at age 30) further decreases household income, although by not nearly 
as much as the first birth. 
 
If the mother remains married, equivalent household income gradually increases over time, 
and this happens for several reasons. As the child[ren] grow older the mother’s probability of 
employment and hours if employed both increase. The mother also has an increase in her 
hourly wage rate as she accumulates labour market experience, and the father’s earnings 
increase as he accumulates labour market experience. As each child becomes financially 
independent of his or her parents the mother’s equivalent household income increases further 
since the child is not then counted as being part of the household. In these simulations this is 
assumed to occur at age 18. 
 
If the marriage ends (assumed to be at age 36) from that time the mother’s equivalent 
household income is below what it would have been if she had remained married. The dashed 
line shows her equivalent household income if she receives child support payment according 
to the rules of the CSS, and the other line shows her equivalent household income when child 
support payments are based upon resident mothers’ reports of what they receive. 
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 The cost of relationship breakdown to the mother at any point in time is the difference 
between equivalent household income if she divorces and what her household income would 
have been had her marriage survived. The total lifetime costs of divorce are represented by 
the total area between the equivalent household income profiles. 
 
An important feature of Figure 4 is that for the low education mother / high education father 
couple, equivalent household income calculated using mothers’ reports of child support is 
less than when child support is calculated by applying the rules of the CSS. 
 
Figure 4. Equivalent after-tax household income by divorce status, Year 10 education 
mother, university degree father, 2 children 
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Under the assumption that child support estimated using mothers’ reports is a lower bound of 
child support actually received, then the actual amount of child support will be somewhere 
between these two amounts. The bottom line is that for this type of (ex-) couple, the 
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 economic living standards of the mother post-divorce are lower than what the design of the 
CSS suggests they should be. While the amounts of child support calculated using the rules of 
the CSS and mothers’ reports differ, the pattern is quite similar.  
 
For the “low education mother/high education” father couple the impact of divorce on 
equivalent household income is the smallest whilst the children are younger (in the years 
immediately following divorce). This is because the loss of the father’s full income is 
partially offset by receipt of a higher level of government benefits and child support 
payments. The costs of divorce also increase because the father’s income increases with age 
and the additional child support payments do not fully compensate this. Once the youngest 
child turns 18 the mother is much worse off since she typically ceases to receive child support 
payments and is no longer eligible for child-related government benefits. 
 
Figure 5 shows the lifetime income profiles for the “high education” couple. The total 
lifetime income consequences of divorce is less in percentage terms and absolute terms for 
the high education couple than for the “low education mother/high education father” couple 
(Figure 4). We will return to the total income costs of divorce to mothers in the following 
section. As for the “low education mother/high education father” couple, equivalent 
household income based upon mothers’ report is less than that based upon the CSS rules.  
 
An important difference between the mothers with low education (Year 10) and those with 
high education (university degree) is that post divorce and while the children are still at 
home, for the high education mothers their household income increases over time (Figures 5 
and 7) whereas it decreases for the low education mothers (Figures 4 and 6). This occurs 
because earnings increase with age at a much faster rate for the high education mothers. 
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 Figure 5. Equivalent after-tax household income by divorce status, university degree 
mother and father, 2 children 
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For the “low education” couple (Figure 6) and the “high education mother/low education 
father” couple (Figure 7) the income costs of divorce for the mother are still substantial but 
are much smaller overall. In contrast to the results for mothers who were married to a “high 
education” man, the method of estimating the amount of child support received makes little 
difference to the post-divorce income.  
Figure 6. Equivalent after-tax household income by divorce status, Year 10 mother 
and father, 2 children 
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 The finding that for “low education” mothers married to “low education” fathers the 
equivalent household income costs of divorce are relatively small when the mother has 
dependent children suggests that the financial incentive for such mothers to remain partnered 
is relatively small.  
Figure 7. Equivalent after-tax household income by divorce status, university degree 
mother and Year 10 father, 2 children 
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The overall effect of divorce 
A summary measure of the impact of divorce on mothers’ working age (hereafter “lifetime”) 
equivalent household income can be constructed by comparing the mothers’ (undiscounted) 
total equivalent household income if divorced to total income if continuously married. The 
costs of divorce are represented by income if divorced as a proportion of income if 
continuously married, and the dollar difference in income if divorced and income if 
continuously married.  
 
Table 2 shows the equivalent household income of a mother who divorces as a percentage of 
what her income would have been had she remained married. The relative income of 
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 divorced as compared to continuously married mothers is calculated using the two different 
methods of estimating the amount of child support she receives (CSS rules and resident 
mothers’ reports). 
 
As an example of how to interpret Table 2, consider a “low education” mother who was 
married to a “high education” man. Assuming that the mother receives child support 
payments according to the rules of the CSS, if she has one child our simulations show that her 
equivalent lifetime household income is 61.5 per cent of what it would have been had she 
remained married. As the number of children she has had increases, the income costs of 
divorce are slightly lower in percentage terms, of 64.4 per cent of non-divorced mothers’ 
incomes for those with two children and of 67.2 per cent for those with three children. The 
smaller income loss is caused by a combination of an increase in the amount of child support 
paid and additional government benefits. 
 
Table 2. Equivalent lifetime (ages 23 to 60) household income costs of divorce 
(percentage of continuous marriage income) 
 1 child 2 children 3 children 
 CSS rules 
Year 10 mother / degree father 61.5 64.4 67.2 
Degree mother / degree father 74.6 75.5 76.6 
Year 10 mother / Year 10 father 76.0 79.3 82.0 
Degree mother / Year 10 father 88.8 89.3 90.1 
 Mothers’ report of child support received 
Year 10 mother / degree father 59.1 61.0 63.2 
Degree mother / degree father 71.8 72.2 73.0 
Year 10 mother / Year 10 father 76.9 80.4 83.2 
Degree mother / Year 10 father 88.7 89.5 90.5 
Notes: The figures are calculated by dividing total equivalent lifetime household income (undiscounted) if 
divorced by total equivalent lifetime household income (undiscounted) if continuously married.  
 
As can be seen from the figures showing the age profile of mothers’ household income 
(Figure 4), the income costs of divorce to the mother are greater when mothers’ reports are 
 22
 used to estimate child support received. If mothers’ reports are used then the mothers’ 
lifetime income falls to 59.1 per cent of what it would have been had she remained married. 
While the differences between child support calculated using the CSS rules and mothers’ 
reports may seem quite small when considered in the context of lifetime income, the method 
of calculating child support makes a substantial difference to the income effects of divorce 
whilst the mother has a dependent child in the household and the father is required to pay 
child support. 
 
Turning to the “high education mother/low education father” couple, the effect of divorce on 
the lifetime equivalent household income of the mother is much smaller – around 90 per cent 
for each of the fertility scenarios. As noted above, for this couple the method of estimating 
child support makes little difference to the effects of divorce on the mother’s lifetime income. 
As well, the income consequences of divorce for the mother (in percentage terms) in the 
positive assortative mating couples (low education and high education couples) are between 
the losses for the other two hypothetical couples. 
 
A key determinant of the relative equivalent household income costs of divorce is the 
disparity in the labour market earning capacity of the father and mother, the major result 
being that the higher the father’s earnings capacity relative to that of the mother the larger the 
lifetime equivalent household income cost of divorce to the mother. Conversely, the higher 
the mother’s earnings capacity relative to that of the father, the smaller the relative income 
effects of divorce on the mother’s lifetime equivalent household income. 
 
While the percentage effect of divorce on mothers’ equivalent household income is smallest 
for the “high education mother/low education father” couple, this cannot be interpreted as 
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 meaning that women in this situation are those made relatively better off in absolute terms 
following divorce since in order to answer this question it is necessary to compare the level of 
lifetime equivalent household income. Accordingly Table 3 shows the actual dollar value of 
lifetime equivalent household income of mothers according to number of children and marital 
history after the birth of her first child (post-children marital history). The top panel shows 
lifetime household incomes assuming that mothers receive child support according to the 
rules of the CSS, and the bottom panel shows lifetime household incomes according to 
mothers’ reports. 
 
We first consider the lifetime income costs of divorce for the case in which child support is 
paid according to the rules of the CSS. Mothers who have one child and who are 
continuously married have an equivalent household income of between $1.8 million for a 
“high education” mother who was married to a high education man and $0.85 million for the 
low education mother who was married to a low education man. As the number of children 
increases, equivalent household income for all of the family types falls. This reflects the fact 
that additional children are estimated to decrease mothers’ earnings and impose an additional 
cost on the family in equivalence scale terms. 
 
An important point from Table 3 is that, for women who are divorced, the more children they 
have the lower is their equivalent household income. The reason for the fall in the relative 
income loss of divorce as the number of children increases is caused by the increase in 
equivalent household income in the case of divorce as compared to equivalent household 
income in the case of continuous marriage; it is not due to women with more children who 
are divorced having a higher income in absolute terms than divorced women with fewer 
children. 
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 Table 3.  Equivalent lifetime (ages 23 to 60) household income by post-children 
marital history, number of children and method of calculating child support 
($’000) 
 Continuously married Divorced 
 1 child 2 children 3 children 1 child 2 children 3 children
 CSS rules 
Year 10 mother / degree father 1,316 1,206 1,121 809 777 754 
Degree mother / degree father 1,719 1,562 1,436 1,281 1,179 1,099 
Year 10 mother / Year 10 father 847 774 728 643 614 597 
Degree mother / Year 10 father 1,250 1,131 1,037 1,110 1,009 934 
 Mothers’ report of child support received 
Year 10 mother / degree father - - - 778 735 708 
Degree mother / degree father - - - 1,234 1,127 1,049 
Year 10 mother / Year 10 father - - - 651 622 605 
Degree mother / Year 10 father - - - 1,109 1,013 939 
 
 
Source of income by post-children marital history 
While divorce impacts upon mothers’ economic wellbeing, it also changes the relative 
importance of income from different sources. In this section estimates of how divorce effects 
the relative contribution made by each source of income are presented. To provide a focus on 
the implications for children, the estimates are for the period over which the mother has 
dependent children.  
 
For all four hypothetical couples, divorce increases the proportion of the income of that 
comes from mothers earnings. To illustrate the results we focus on the mother from the “low 
education mother / low education father” couple. The proportion of income that comes from 
her earnings increases from 30.0 per cent if she is continuously married to 36.3 per cent if she 
divorces. The proportion of the income of the household in which the mother lives that comes 
directly from the father’s earnings whilst he is living in the household falls from 66.5 to 37.6 
per cent, a fall which is partially offset by fathers’ contributions in the form of child support 
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 (4.5 per cent of the mother’s household income). In addition government benefits become 
much more important, increasing from 3.5 to 21.6 per cent of the income of the household in 
which the mother lives. Similar patterns are evident for mothers from the other hypothetical 
couples.  
 
As the number of children increases the proportion of mothers income which comes from 
child support increases. For example, for a Year 10 educated mother whose ex-partner has a 
degree, the proportion of her equivalent household income which is from child support 
payments ranges from 11.8 per cent if they have one child to 21.4 per cent if they have three 
children. 
 
Table 4. Components of after-tax household income while has dependent children by 
marital history and type of couple 
 1 child  2 children  3 children  
 Continuous 
marriage 
Divorce Continuous 
marriage 
Divorce Continuous 
marriage 
Divorce 
 Per cent 
 Degree mother / Year 10 father 
Mother’s earnings 51.2 65.9 47.2 60.3 43.6 54.1 
Father’s earnings 47.2 26.3 49.6 24.5 51.3 22.6 
Government benefits 1.6 5.2 3.2 10.6 5.1 17.6 
Child Support 0.0 2.6 0.0 4.6 0.0 5.7 
 Year 10 mother / degree father 
Mother’s earnings 19.7 25.9 16.1 20.0 13.3 15.7 
Father’s earnings 79.3 49.2 81.0 43.7 81.7 39.5 
Government benefits 1.0 13.1 2.9 18.6 5.0 23.4 
Child Support 0.0 11.8 0.0 17.8 0.0 21.4 
 Degree mother and father 
Mother’s earnings 37.3 51.1 34.2 46.5 31.5 42.1 
Father’s earnings 62.6 37.4 65.5 34.6 67.7 32.2 
Government benefits 0.0 3.0 0.4 5.1 0.8 8.5 
Child Support 0.0 8.5 0.0 13.8 0.0 17.3 
 Year 10 mother and father 
Mother’s earnings 30.0 36.3 24.6 27.6 19.8 21.0 
Father’s earnings 66.5 37.6 67.8 33.0 66.5 28.9 
Government benefits 3.5 21.6 7.6 32.7 13.8 42.5 
Child Support 0.0 4.5 0.0 6.6 0.0 7.6 
Notes: Child support calculated using the rules of the CSS. Figures are constructed by dividing income from 
each source by net after-tax unequivalised household income. For women with one child the age range 
over which income is calculated is 28 to 45, for two children it is 28 to 47 and for three children it is 28 
to 49. 
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 7.  Conclusion 
This paper has examined the effects of divorce on the economic situation of Australian 
mothers and their children, and the effects of divorce on equivalent household incomes for 
women in a range of circumstances are also simulated. The relative earnings capacity of the 
mother and father is an important factor in determining the effects of divorce for the mother 
compared to what would have been the case had she remained married. We consider the 
effects of divorce for women with one, two and three children. 
 
After divorce a mother no longer has access to all of the father’s income, although non-
resident fathers may continue to contribute to the income of the household in their ex-wives’ 
lives through child support payments. While under the CSS a formula is used to calculate the 
amount of money a non-resident parent is required to pay, resident parents report, on average, 
receiving less child support than non-resident parents report paying. We conduct all of the 
simulations using two different estimates of child support: using the CSS formula; and using 
mothers’ reports of child support received. These different methods of estimating child 
support can have quite important implications for mothers’ post-divorce living standards.  
 
The main findings are: 
• Mothers’ equivalent household incomes fall following divorce. For example, a low 
education mother who was married to a high education man with whom she has one child 
is estimated to have an equivalent lifetime household income that is 61.5 per cent of what 
it would have been had she remained married; 
• The relative income costs of divorce differ greatly depending upon the relative earnings 
capacity of the mother and father. For women who marry a man with much greater labour 
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 market earnings capacity, as reflected in education, than her earning capacity, the income 
costs of divorce are particularly large; 
• The percentage effect of divorce on mothers’ equivalent household income are smallest 
for the “high education” mother who was married to a “low education” man (11.2 per 
cent for mother with one child), followed by the “low education” mother who was 
married to a “low education” man (24.0 per cent for mother with one child), followed by 
the “high education” mother who was married to a “high education” man (25.4 per cent 
for mother with one child). The largest income losses are for the “low education” mother 
who was married to a “high education” man (38.5 per cent for a mother with one child); 
• The relative income costs of divorce fall as the number of children increases. This occurs 
for two reasons. First, the level of government support increases as the number of 
children increases. Second, father’s child support contributions increase as the number of 
children increase at a rate faster than the costs of children as implied by the equivalence 
scale; 
• Mothers’ household incomes after divorce would be higher if they received child support 
levels commensurate with the government’s non-resident parent child support rules;  
• Following divorce, a much high proportion of mothers’ household income is derived from 
government benefits. For example, for a mother with year 10 education who is married to 
man with a degree and has two children, 2.9 per cent of lifetime income comes from 
government benefits. This is estimated to increase to 18.6 per cent if the mother gets 
divorced.  Australian social security provisions act as an important offset to the economic 
penalty associated with parental separation, particularly as the number of children 
increases; 
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 Appendix A. Summary Statistics and Regression Results 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics for probability of employment and earnings equations 
 Earnings equation Employment equation 
 Females Males Female Male 
Employment   68% 83% 
Weekly earnings $595 $926   
Experience (years) 16.1 19.2   
Tenure (years) 5.6 7.1   
Age (years) 37.6 37.7 38.6 39.0 
Has children under 3 8%  14%  
Has children 3 to 5 10%  14%  
Has one child 5 to 15 14%  15%  
Has two children 6 to 15 11%  12%  
Has three or more children 6 to 15 5%  5%  
Ever had a child 61%  70%  
Year 10 or less education 16% 14% 23% 18% 
Year 11 education 5% 5% 6% 5% 
Trade 23% 37% 21% 37% 
University degree 31% 25% 23% 21% 
Inner regional 25% 26% 27% 27% 
Outer regional 11% 10% 13% 13% 
Victoria 27% 26% 26% 25% 
Queensland 20% 20% 20% 20% 
South Australia 8% 8% 9% 9% 
Western Australia 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Tasmania 3% 2% 3% 3% 
Northern Territory / Australian Capital 
Territory 3% 3% 2% 2% 
Poor Health 8% 9% 12% 13% 
NESB migrant 12% 13% 15% 14% 
ESB migrant 11% 11% 10% 11% 
Has partner 68% 70% 70% 68% 
Has partner * divorced 8% 8% 9% 8% 
Never married 14% 18% 12% 18% 
1 to 3 years since divorce 3%  3%  
4 to 10 years since Divorce 6%  7%  
11 or more years since divorce 10%  11%  
Partner employed 62%  59%  
Number of observations 2,723 3,003 4,871 4,604 
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 Table A2. Determinants of the probability of employment, logistic regression  
 Females  Males  
 Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat 
Age 0.1701 6.04 0.2184 7.64 
Age squared -0.0023 -6.50 -0.0030 -8.73 
Has children under 3 -1.5687 -12.18   
Has children 3 to 5 -0.6881 -6.18   
Has one child 5 to 15 -0.2478 -2.11   
Has two children 6 to 15 -0.5581 -4.34   
Has three or more children 6 to 15 -0.9184 -5.60   
Ever had a child -0.5698 -3.38   
Year 10 or less education -0.6834 -6.95 -0.7253 -5.34 
Year 11 education -0.2393 -1.56 -0.2985 -1.46 
Trade 0.2789 2.69 0.0268 0.21 
University degree 0.7588 6.78 0.4858 2.97 
Inner regional 0.0793 0.88 -0.0508 -0.45 
Outer regional 0.1690 1.49 -0.2094 -1.57 
Victoria 0.1155 1.21 0.1220 1.00 
Queensland -0.1253 -1.20 -0.1044 -0.83 
South Australia -0.1272 -0.95 -0.3156 -1.99 
Western Australia -0.0345 -0.26 0.1230 0.73 
Tasmania 0.3441 1.61 -0.4532 -1.82 
Northern Territory / Australian Capital Territory 0.3854 1.51 0.7636 1.94 
Poor Health -1.0508 -10.10 -1.5242 -14.63 
NESB migrant -0.6892 -6.81 -0.9323 -7.70 
ESB migrant -0.0537 -0.42 -0.1084 -0.71 
Has partner -0.8647 -4.08 1.0354 8.43 
Has partner * divorced -0.0411 -0.17 -0.3512 -2.16 
Never married 0.1231 0.65 0.1158 0.73 
1 to 3 years since divorce 0.3088 1.15   
4 to 10 years since Divorce 0.2203 0.92   
11 or more years since divorce 0.0940 0.40   
Partner employed 1.6012 13.50   
Constant -1.3470 -2.53 -1.8374 -3.26 
Number of observations 4871  4604  
Pseudo R2 0.2001  0.1776  
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  Table A3. Determinants of weekly earnings, (natural logarithm of weekly earnings)  
 Female Male 
 Coefficients T-statistics Coefficients T-statistics 
Experience 0.041534 5.02 0.033883 3.58 
Experience squared -0.00062 -3.19 -0.00029 -1.39 
Age 0.034078 2.38 0.033898 1.8 
Age squared -0.00063 -3.55 -0.00066 -2.66 
Tenure 0.03196 6.38 0.022222 6.39 
Tenure squared -0.00069 -3.45 -0.00044 -3.74 
Has children under 3 years -0.26148 -4.52   
Has children 3 to 5 years -0.21458 -4.28   
Has one child 6 to 15 years -0.13388 -3.21   
Has two children 6 to 15 years -0.24738 -5.1   
Has three or more children 6 to 15 years -0.34133 -4.98   
Ever had a child -0.20833 -4.02   
Year 10 or less education -0.14478 -3.47 -0.13957 -4.05 
Year 11 -0.02972 -0.51 0.06041 1.41 
Trade 0.11974 3.78 0.071726 2.6 
University degree 0.428211 14.2 0.413871 12.25 
Inner regional -0.10146 -3.33 -0.12838 -5.49 
Outer regional -0.13084 -3.27 -0.09966 -2.81 
Victoria -0.07829 -2.6 -0.03433 -1.32 
Queensland -0.04501 -1.37 -0.09974 -3.62 
South Australia -0.20597 -4.28 -0.19847 -5.52 
Western Australia -0.15087 -3.45 -0.07303 -2 
Tasmania -0.2076 -2.69 -0.12089 -1.79 
Northern Territory / Australian Capital Territory 0.057487 0.96 0.10008 1.86 
Poor health -0.08614 -1.96 -0.11569 -3.01 
NESB migrant 0.009549 0.26 -0.1203 -3.76 
ESB migrant 0.029909 0.75 0.084258 2.84 
Has partner -0.12325 -1.76 0.096953 3.04 
Has partner * divorced 0.071275 1.02 -0.046 -1.23 
Never married -0.20181 -4.4 -0.16634 -3.82 
1 to 3 years since divorce -0.16275 -1.63   
4 to 10 years since divorce 0.044483 0.62   
11 or more years since divorce 0.075852 1.12   
Partner employed 0.108985 1.79   
Constant 5.527734 24.36 5.752153 20.17 
Number of observations 2723  3003  
Adjusted R squared 0.2933  0.2996  
Notes: Robust standard errors have been used. 
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 Table A4. Determinants of mothers’ report of child support received, $ per annum, 
Tobit model 
 Coefficient T-stat Mean 
Total maintenance received   $2,504 
Age 117.9079 0.35 36.1 
Age squared -0.0262463 -0.01  
Weekly wage income 10.76669 2.53 $129 
Weekly wage income squared -0.0171471 -2.29  
Child[ren] 0-5 with non-resident parent 1459.731 1.51 23% 
1 child 6-17 with non-resident parent 28.24961 0.02 49% 
2 children 6-17 with non-resident parent 2841.332 2.05 29% 
3 children 6-17 with non-resident parent 3946.734 2.56 11% 
Year 10 or less 948.3254 1.2 29% 
Year 11 1253.059 1.07 8% 
Trade 743.8811 0.91 22% 
University degree 826.5417 0.84 15% 
Inner regional -636.3878 -0.98 31% 
Outer regional -2569.619 -2.72 13% 
NESB migrant -1750.216 -1.94 13% 
ESB migrant 65.25061 0.07 10% 
Partner -2004.134 -2.91 35% 
Never married -2164.666 -1.65 7% 
3 years or less since divorce 2631.656 2.88 23% 
4 to 10 years since divorce 2947.252 4.05 46% 
Buying home 890.0805 0.96 32% 
Renting home -1709.728 -1.82 56% 
Constant -6591.563 -1.06  
Number of observations 499   
Uncensored observations 264   
Censored observations 235   
Pseudo R2 0.0212   
Notes: Sample is restricted to mothers who have children where the child has a parent living elsewhere and 
hence could be receiving child support payments. 
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